Badpuppy Gay Today

Monday, 02 June, 1997

Encryption technologies are the locks and keys of the Information age--enabling individuals and businesses to protect sensitive information as it is transmitted over the Internet. As more and more individuals and businesses come on-line, the need for strong, reliable, easy-to-use encryption technologies has become a critical issue to the health and viability of the Net.

On May 14th, the House Judiciary Committee approved a bill designed to dramatically enhance the ability of Internet users to protect their privacy and security on-line.

The bill now moves to the House International Relations Committee, where it is expected to face tougher opposition from the FBI, NSA, and the Clinton Administration. The International Relations Committee is expected to consider the bill soon.

The Security and Freedom through Encryption Act (SAFE - HR 695) will prohibit the government from imposing mandatory law enforcement access to private on-line communications inside the U.S., affirm the right of American Citizens to use whatever form of encryption they choose, and relax current export restrictions which prevent the development of strong, easy-to-use encryption technologies.

The Clinton Administration, led by the FBI and the National Security agency, opposes SAFE and is pushing for a policy of domestic restrictions on the use of encryption, guaranteed law enforcement access to private communications via government designed "key-recovery" systems, and continued reliance on out-dated, cold-war era export controls.

For the first time in history, Congress is close to passing real encryption policy reform legislation which will protect privacy, promote electronic commerce, and recognizes the realities of the global Internet.

Current U.S. encryption policy, which limits the strength of encryption products U.S. companies can sell abroad, also limits the availability of strong, easy-to-use encryption technologies in the United States. U.S. hardware and software manufacturers who wish to sell their products on the global market must either conform to U.S. encryption export limits or produce two separate versions of the same product, a costly and complicated alternative.

The export controls, which the NSA and FBI argue help to keep strong encryption out of the hands of foreign adversaries, are having the opposite effect. Strong encryption is available abroad, but because of the export limits and the confusion created by nearly four years of debate over U.S. encryption policy, strong, easy-to-use privacy and security technologies are not widely available off the shelf or "on the net" here in the U.S.

A recently discovered flaw in the security of the new digital telephone network exposed the worst aspects of the Administration's encryption policy. Because the designers needed to be able to export their products, the system's security was "dumbed down". Researchers subsequently discovered that it is quite easy to break the security of the system and intrude on what should be private conversations.

This incident underscores the larger policy problem: U.S. companies are at a competitive disadvantage in the global marketplace when competing against companies that do not have such hindrances. And now, for the first time in history, the Clinton Administration has DOMESTIC RESTRICTIONS on the ability of Americans to protect their privacy and security on-line.

On Wednesday May 21, a group of leading cryptographers and computer scientists released a report which for the first time examines the risks and implications of government-designed key-recovery systems.

The report cautions that "The deployment of a general key-recovery-based encryption infrastructure to meet law enforcement's stated requirements will result in substantial sacrifices in security and cost to the end user. Building a secure infrastructure of the breathtaking scale and complexity demanded by these requirements is far beyond the experience and current competency of the field."

The report substantially changes the terms of the ongoing debate over U.S. encryption policy. For more than four years, the Clinton Administration has pushed for a policy of continued export restrictions on strong encryption, and the development of global key escrow and key recovery systems to address the concerns of law enforcement. The study, the first comprehensive analysis of the risks of key recovery and key escrow systems, calls into question the viability of the Administration's approach.

The Report's authors, recognized leaders in the cryptography and computer science field, include Hal Abelson, Ross Anderson, Steven M. Bellovin, Josh Benaloh, Matt Blaze, Whitfield Diffie, John Gilmore, Peter G. Neumann, Ronald L. Rivest, Jeffery I. Schiller, and Bruce Schneier

The report is available on-line at http://www.crypto.com/key_study/

WHAT YOU CAN DO

All of us care about our national security, and no one wants to make it any easier for criminals and terrorists to commit criminal acts. But we must also recognize encryption technologies can aid law enforcement

and protect national security by limiting the threat of industrial espionage and foreign spying, promote electronic commerce and protecting privacy.

Congress needs to hear from you! If you value your privacy and care about the future of the Net, please take a few moments to join the Adopt Your Legislator campaign: http://www.crypto.com/adopt/

What's at stake in this debate is nothing less than the future of privacy and the fate of the Internet as a secure and trusted medium for commerce, education, and political discourse